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Post by Rev. Agave on Aug 26, 2008 16:07:57 GMT -6
We often discuss the law of parties (particularily in TX) on this board, so I figured I'd do a bit of research on the subject. I found the information below (taken from the Texas Criminal Practice Guide) to be very thorough an informative. It takes a few minutes to read, but I think it is worth it if you are interested in how things work in TX: DIVISION XIII SUBSTANTIVE LAW CHAPTER 121 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY PART I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
5-121 Texas Criminal Practice Guide § 121.03
§ 121.03 Parties to Offenses
[1] Generally
It is essential to a conviction for any offense that the accused be criminally responsible for the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by the person's own conduct, by the conduct of another person for whom the person is responsible, or by both [Pen. C. § 7.01(a); Zuckerman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] . To be guilty as a party, the evidence must show the defendant's intent to promote or assist the entire offense [ Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. App., Fort Worth 2003, pet. filed) proof that defendant aided commission of theft insufficient to show guilt of aggravated robbery when defendant did not have weapon and defendant lacked knowledge of actions of co-defendants at least in absence of co-conspirator theory of complicity in indictment; see [3] infra]. Each party to an offense may be charged with the commission of the offense, and the indictment need not allege whether the person acted as a principal or an accomplice [Pen. C. § 7.01(b), (c); see Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) law of parties as applicable to reckless offenses]. All distinctions between principals and accomplices have been abolished by the Penal Code [Pen. C. § 7.01(c)].
An indictment need not allege that the defendant is being prosecuted under a party theory or state the facts that make the defendant a party [ Stein v. State, 689 S.W.2d 932, 934-935 (Tex. App., Dallas 1985, pet. ref.) ; see Leger v. State, 688 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. App., Beaumont 1985, no pet.) requisites for conspiracy need not be alleged for court to charge on whether defendant and another conspired to commit offense]. Nor is it necessary that the application paragraph of the jury charge specifically name the persons that the accused assisted to commit the crime [ Gordon v. State, 714 S.W.2d 76, 76 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1986, no writ) so long as jury can determine other party's identity, not error to refuse a requested charge specifically naming party; Green v. State, 930 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App., Fort Worth 1996, pet. filed)] . However, if the state indicts the defendant specifically as a party, the indictment must allege both facts giving rise to the criminal responsibility and a proper culpable mental state [see Thompson v. State, 697 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ''acting together'' not culpable mental state; Burnworth v. State, 698 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. App., Tyler 1985, no pet.) insufficient only to allege codefendant's acts]. Even if a party liability theory is not alleged in the charging instrument, a conviction may not be affirmed on a party liability theory unless the jury charge specifically and adequately authorizes the jury to convict the accused upon that theory. A charge is adequate for this purpose if it contains either an application paragraph specifying all the conditions to be met before a conviction under such a theory is authorized, or contains an application paragraph authorizing a conviction under conditions specified by other paragraphs of the jury charge to which the application paragraph necessarily refers or contains some logically consistent combination of such paragraphs [ Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) conviction reversed because application paragraph of jury charge did not include party liability instruction and evidence did not show that defendant committed theft by his own conduct].
For a defendant to be considered a party to an offense, he or she must commit some culpable act before or during the commission of the offense itself [ Morrison v. State, 608 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)] . A person may also be guilty as a party if he or she agreed before commission of the offense to act as an accessory after the fact [see Emmett v. State, 654 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tex. App., Dallas 1983, no pet.) ; cf. Pesina v. State, 949 S.W.2d 374, 385 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1997) disagreeing with Emmett in holding that acts committed after offense completed cannot make one a party to offense although such conduct may constitute independent offense of hindering apprehension or prosecution].
[2] Types of Party Responsibility
A defendant is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another person if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, the defendant causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense [Pen. C. § 7.02(a)(1); see Landry v. State, 653 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)] . Also, a defendant is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another person if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, the defendant solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense [Pen. C. § 7.02(a)(2)]. Thus, in order to convict a defendant under this theory of party liability, the state must prove conduct by the primary actor that constitutes an offense, plus an act by the defendant done with the intent to promote or assist the conduct. However, a defendant specifically indicted as a party under Penal Code Section 7.02(a)(2) is not entitled to further allegation of the manner in which he or she is supposed to have solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the primary actor in the commission of the offense [ Swope v. State, 805 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Crim App. 1991)] . Finally, a defendant is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another person if, having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, the defendant fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense [Pen. C. § 7.02(a)(3)].
The language of Section 7.02(a)(2) of the Penal Code creates a broad liability [ Sewell v. State, 578 S.W.2d 131, 136-137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] . Under that provision, a person can become criminally responsible for an offense by assisting in the planning of the offense even if the person's participation ended before the actual commission of the offense [ Cross v. State, 550 S.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)] . When criminal responsibility is predicated on this provision, it may be a defense to the alleged responsibility if the perpetrator engaged in the criminal conduct by virtue of an independent impulse, not pursuant to a common intent [see Binyon v. State, 545 S.W.2d 448, 451 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)] . The thrust of such a defense would be that the defendant could not have had an intent to promote or assist in the commission of independently conceived offenses [see Navarro v. State, 776 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex. App., Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref.)] . While the statute allows criminal responsibility for the conduct of another and eliminates the necessity of proof of intent to commit the felony actually committed, it does not excuse the State from proving a culpable mental state. The statute requires the State to show that the defendant had both the mens rea to engage in a conspiracy and the culpable mental state to commit the underlying felony [ Gravis, 982 S.W.2d 933, 938 ; Cienfuegos v. State, 113 S.W.3d 481, 493 (Tex. App., Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) statute does not violate due process because conspiracy theory of complicity does not eliminate proof of required mental element].
In cases involving accomplices or coconspirators [see § 121.03[3], below], counsel should bear in mind that the testimony of an accomplice or coconspirator must be corroborated by independent evidence connecting the defendant with the offense. If there is no such corroboration, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law [C.C.P. Art. 38.14; see Ch. 73B, Witnesses ].
[3] Responsibility of Conspirators
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are responsible for the felony actually committed, although having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy [Pen. C. § 7.02(b); see § 121.04[1], [2], [4], attempt and conspiracy]. This means that all the conspirators should have anticipated the commission of the felony that actually occurred [ Koonce v. State, 654 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tex. App., Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref.) ; but see Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 543 (Tex. App., Fort Worth 2003, pet. filed) distinguishing Koonce because evidence showed that defendant only intended to aid others in committing theft portion of offense but not aggravating elements of aggravated robbery]. The same theory makes a defendant responsible for acts of aggravation committed by others during the offense [ Jackson v. State, 700 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. App., Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.)] . It is not necessary that the criminal offense of conspiracy be charged in the indictment in order for the state to obtain a jury instruction on this theory of complicity that is based upon the foreseeable actions of a co-defendant.
An example of this theory is that, if several companions set forth to rob a store and are carrying guns, it should be anticipated that a person could be killed as a result of the robbery. If, during the robbery, a coconspirator does kill a person, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death even though they had no intent to kill anyone [see Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349, 356-357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ; see also Curtis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)] . However, if the act of the co-conspirator occurred as a result of an independent impulse and not as a part of the conspiracy or the act was not an action that should have been anticipated as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, the other conspirators are not liable [see Hooper v. State, 170 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App., Waco 2005, no pet. hist.) while defendant intended to assist robbery by driving get-away car insufficent evidence that he intended to assist codefendant to shoot at pursuing police officer; Skidmore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ; Baldridge v. State, 543 S.W.2d 639, 642-643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)] . Although the state's proof may fail if the jury finds that the actions of a co-conspirator were an independent impulse, this doctrine has not been recognized as an enumerated defense for which a separate jury instruction is required. Because a claim of ''independent impulse'' simply negates the conspiracy liability theory of the State's case, giving the party liability instruction is sufficient for the jury to consider an independent impulse claim presented by the defense [ Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) overruling Mayfield 716 S.W.2d 509, 516 which had recognized right to separate instruction].
[4] Independence of Party Responsibility
In a prosecution in which an accused's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, the accused may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and on proof that he or she was a party to its commission. It is no defense that the accused belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity [Pen. C. § 7.03(1)]. For example, a woman could be convicted of rape as a party to the offense [ Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)] . Similarly, a man could be convicted of engaging in prostitution as a lesser included offense of compelling prostitution [ Raven v. State, 533 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)] .
Also, it is no defense to a prosecution that the person for whose conduct the accused is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution [Pen. C. § 7.03(2); see Reece v. State, 521 S.W.2d 633, 634-635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) one party may be convicted of aggravated robbery while another party is convicted of simple robbery]. For example, a defendant who actually transfers a drug to an informant, who then transfers it to a police officer, can be convicted even though the informant's action does not render the informant criminally liable [see Boyer v. State, 801 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ; see also Tate v. State, 811 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) defendant may be convicted as long as defendant solicited conduct of informant that resulted in commission of offense]. This is because the acquittal of an actual perpetrator may be based on many considerations, few of which may have any logical connection with the culpability of an accused tried as a party [ Standefer v. United States, 446 U.S. 10, 25, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 64 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980) parties may be punished for their own criminal conduct, and fate of other participants is irrelevant]. An accomplice may be found guilty of a different, more serious offense than the principal or other accomplices and an acquittal of the principal does not prevent conviction of an accomplice [ Ex Parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) defendant's conviction of capital murder that may have been based upon party liability not invalidated by jury's later refusal to convict principle of capital murder]. However, if an acquittal is based on a finding that the perpetrator did not commit an act considered to be criminal, there can be no party liability, since a conviction requires the commission of an offense [see Pen. C. § 7.03; Richardson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 234, 235-236 (Tex. App., Corpus Christi 1982, no pet.) evidence insufficient to support conviction under party theory when no evidence offered to show that other person committed the offense].
[5] Corporate Criminal Responsibility
Generally
An individual is defined in the Penal Code as a human being who has been born and is alive [Pen. C. § 1.07(a)(26)]. Therefore, an offense that is defined as the act or omission of an individual can be committed only by a natural person. A person, on the other hand, includes individuals, corporations, and associations [Pen. C. § 1.07(a)(26)]. As a result, a corporation or association can commit any offense that is defined in terms of the act or omission of a person [see Collection Consultants, Inc. v. State, 556 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) , app. dis., 436 U.S. 901, 98 S. Ct. 2228, 56 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1978) harassment by the use of a telephone]. For example, a corporation may be liable for specific intent crimes and offenses of criminal negligence [see Vaughan and Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d 805, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) corporation can commit criminally negligent homicide].
The term corporation includes nonprofit corporations, professional associations created pursuant to statute, and joint stock companies [Pen. C. § 1.07(a)(13); Bus. Corp. Act Art. 1.02A(1),(2), definition of corporation]. Association means a government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic interest [Pen. C. § 1.07(a)(5); see Ch. 120, Classification and Punishment of Offenses , punishment of corporate entities].
Corporate Responsibility for Agents
A corporation or association can be criminally responsible for conduct constituting an offense performed by an agent acting on behalf of the corporation or association and within the scope of the agent's office or employment if the offense is one for which corporations and associations are expressly or plainly liable or is a strict liability offense defined outside the Penal Code for which no purpose to exempt corporations and associations plainly appears [Pen. C. § 7.22(a); see Pen. C. § 7.21(1), defining ''agents'']. The statute has been upheld against claims that it is unconstitutional as applied to governmental entities [ Ex parte Austin Independent School District, 23 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. App., Austin 2000, pet. filed)] .
A corporation or association is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if the commission was authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by [Pen. C. § 7.22(b)]: 1. A majority of the governing board acting on behalf of the corporation or association; or
2. A high managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation or association and within the scope of his or her office of employment [see Pen. C. § 7.21(2), defining ''high managerial agent''].
However, it is an affirmative defense, in prosecutions under Section 7.22(a)(1),(2) of the Penal Code, if the high managerial agent having supervisory power over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense [Pen. C. § 7.24; see Axtell v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 264, 216 S.W. 394, 394-395 (1919)] .
[c] Individual Responsibility for Corporation
An individual is criminally responsible for conduct that the person performs in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in the person's own name or behalf [Pen. C. § 7.23(a); Littlefield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 534, 535-536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] . An agent having primary responsibility for the discharge of a duty to act imposed by law on a corporation or association is criminally responsible for the omission to discharge the duty to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly on him or her [Pen. C. § 7.23(b)]. If an individual is so convicted, he or she is subject to the sentence authorized by law for an individual convicted of the offense [Pen. C. § 7.23(c)].
[6] Jury Charge
A court may charge the jury on the law of parties and authorize conviction on that theory even if there is no party allegation in the indictment [ Pitts v. State, 569 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)] . This is true even if the indictment alleges that the defendant ''personally'' committed the acts constituting the offense [see Igo v. State, 723 S.W.2d 290, 291-292 (Tex. App., Fort Worth 1987, pet. ref.)] . If the facts do not support the submission of the case on the theory that the defendant was the primary actor, the charge should require the jury to find that the principal actor committed the criminal act charged, and that the defendant could be held responsible for those acts, if at all, because of the defendant's encouragement, assistance, or other act constituting party responsibility [ Anaya v. State, 677 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1984, pet. ref.)] . Therefore, the state may introduce evidence that the named principal has been convicted of the underlying crime [ Williams v. State, 760 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. App., Texarkana 1988, pet. ref.)] . If the jury is not instructed in this manner, a conviction will be set aside when the defendant's responsibility for the offense was solely as a party [ Drager v. State, 555 S.W.2d 743, 745 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ; see Zuckerman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] . Further, if the defendant is charged with an offense under the theory that someone else committed the crime and the defendant assisted, the charge must be formulated this way and it is error to charge the jury as if the defendant actually committed the criminal act [ Jaycon v. State, 651 S.W.2d 803, 807-808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ; but see Smith v. State, 651 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App., Amarillo 1983, no pet.) when defendant charged with acting with another, jury charge not fundamentally defective for authorizing conviction by finding defendant acted alone if acting with another is not essential element of crime]. It is also error to permit a conviction on a theory that the defendant acted alone or with another when the evidence only supports the party theory of liability [ Howell v. State, 661 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. App., Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.) ; but see Watson v. State, 693 S.W.2d 938, 940-942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) such charge increases state's burden and is harmless; see Rico v. State, 707 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) opinion on rehearing, no error in charging on theory defendant acted alone or as party under indictment charging party theory].
An error in submitting a charge on parties is harmless if the state relies for conviction on evidence that clearly supports the defendant's guilt as a principal [ Montes v. State, 724 S.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ; see Black v. State, 723 S.W.2d 674, 675 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) reversal required only if law of parties necessary for jury's decision; Ruiz v. State, 766 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Tex. App., Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.) failure to apply law to facts harmless when evidence clearly supports defendant's guilt as principal]. If, however, the state clearly proceeds on a party theory, the failure to properly apply the law to the facts requires reversal even in the presence of sufficient evidence to convict the defendant as a primary actor [ Johnson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 299, 302-303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ; see Jones v. State, 815 S.W. 2d 667, 668-671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)] .
When the law of parties is explained abstractly in the jury charge and does not apply the law to the facts of the case, fundamental error is not created by the charge in the absence of an objection [ Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)] . The charge is also not fundamentally defective for failing to name the other parties [ Durst v. State, 675 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. App., Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref.) ; see Gordon v. State, 714 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1986, no pet.) no error despite objection]. Nevertheless, if the defendant makes a timely objection to the charge's failure to apply the law of parties to the facts or requests a special charge applying the law of parties in a case in which he or she was not the actual perpetrator of the offense, failure of the trial court to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case is reversible error [ Apodaca v. State, 589 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) , Rasmussen v. State, 608 S.W.2d 205, 207-208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)] . An objection made on this basis should be stated with great specificity, and it is advisable to offer a requested instruction along with the objection [see Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 943-944, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) Campbell, J., concurring and dissenting, arguing that plurality is really saying that defendant needs to couple objection with requested instruction to preserve error in this situation].
The charge should allege not only that the defendant acted with the necessary intent, but it should also allege an act done by the defendant [see Marion v. State, 652 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (concurring opinion) solicitation or encouragement are acts; see also Johnson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 299, 305 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) merely inserting phrase ''either acting alone or as a party'' in application portion of charge is not sufficient]. Conversely, a charge is defective if it alleges an act done by the defendant, but fails to allege the necessary intent [see Flowers v. Blackburn, 779 F.2d 1115, 1121-1123 (5th Cir. [La.] 1986)]. Additionally, the defendant is entitled to any charge that the other party would be entitled to [ Misner v. State, 610 S.W.2d 502, 503-504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) defendant as entitled to same self-defense charge as person who actually committed murder].
The independent impulse defense rests on the creation of a reasonable doubt that the offense charged was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose of the parties [see [2], above]. When the evidence raises this issue, the defendant is entitled on timely request to a jury charge on the matter [ Simmons v. State, 594 S.W.2d 760, 763-764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) failure to give requested charge held harmless error because an equally beneficial instruction had been given].
[7] Sufficiency of Evidence
If the state relies on a party theory of criminal responsibility to convict the defendant, it is the state's burden to show that the defendant acted in a manner that comports with this theory [ Allen v. State, 686 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1985, no pet.)] . The court may look to events before, during, and after the commission of the offense in determining the existence of party liability. These events may show an understanding and a common design to do a certain act. Therefore, participation in an enterprise may be inferred from the circumstances and need not be shown by direct evidence. Thus, circumstantial evidence alone may show that one is a party to the offense [ Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 468-469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ; Binyon v. State, 545 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)] . For example, the defendant's demeanor after the act can be considered evidence of a prior agreement to commit the offense [ Martinez v. State, 653 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex. App., San Antonio 1983, pet. ref.)] .
The presence of an accused during the commission of an offense is not, by itself, sufficient evidence of the person's participation in the crime [ Ellis v. State, 551 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)] , nor is the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime some hours after its occurrence [ Earnhart v. State, 575 S.W.2d 551, 554-555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)] . However, although mere presence at the scene of an offense is not sufficient to establish liability as a party to the offense, the presence is a circumstance that, considered with other facts in evidence, may suffice to show that the accused was a participant [ Ashabranner v. State, 557 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) additional facts included statement by accused to victim that something bad would happen to him and proved that accused had motive to want to injure victim; see Garza v. State, 573 S.W.2d 536, 537-538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)] .
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Aug 26, 2008 17:11:39 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law.
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Post by Stormyweather on Aug 26, 2008 17:17:48 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law. For once you're right, Hitler couldn't have because he was an evil dictator. You would have been executed by his word of mouth if he so wanted. No trial, no nothing, unless he wanted it for show. If he would have wanted you found guiltly it would have happened.
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mst3k4evur
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Post by mst3k4evur on Aug 26, 2008 20:26:52 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law. Why do you keep equating Hitler's victims and hardcore criminals?
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Post by Shaka on Aug 26, 2008 22:36:27 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law. For once you're right, Hitler couldn't have because he was an evil dictator. You would have been executed by his word of mouth if he so wanted. No trial, no nothing, unless he wanted it for show. If he would have wanted you found guiltly it would have happened. Example the conspirator that tried and failed "July 20 plot" to blow Hitler up, with one or two exception like Rommel were all given show trias before being garotted with piano wire. Either in his quest for attention, or more probably stupid equates deliberate and law means with such a disgusting regime. And they say I'm the crazy one
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Rand
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Post by Rand on Aug 27, 2008 0:42:21 GMT -6
The comical thing about it is that they think Hitler was worse than Stalin, Chairman Mao, or Castro when of course, he was a piker compared to them. You should cure your anti-communist obsession Cali. To answer the topic, there's always a difference between the theory and the reality.
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Post by Stormyweather on Aug 27, 2008 7:40:29 GMT -6
The comical thing about it is that they think Hitler was worse than Stalin, Chairman Mao, or Castro when of course, he was a piker compared to them. You should cure your anti-communist obsession Cali. Why should he? Is he not entitled to his opinion?
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Post by iamjumbo on Aug 27, 2008 7:54:10 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law. your ignorance and total inability to reason rationally never ceases to amaze. some day, you're going to run out of shrooms fool. of course, i realize that they only aid your hallucinations
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Post by iamjumbo on Aug 27, 2008 7:58:20 GMT -6
the felony murder rule exists in virtually every civilized nation. in britain, it's called the criminal enterprise statute. it has other names in other countries, but the premise remains the same everywhere. the maximum penalty is prescribed for every participant in a felony. NO intelligent person would try to claim that there is anything unfair about it whatsoever
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Post by Deleted on Aug 28, 2008 2:04:56 GMT -6
Hitler couldn't have written a better law. your ignorance and total inability to reason rationally never ceases to amaze. some day, you're going to run out of shrooms fool. of course, i realize that they only aid your hallucinations Yeah fool whatver you say fool you're always so fuckin right fool.
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Post by iamjumbo on Aug 28, 2008 9:47:45 GMT -6
your ignorance and total inability to reason rationally never ceases to amaze. some day, you're going to run out of shrooms fool. of course, i realize that they only aid your hallucinations Yeah fool whatver you say fool you're always so fuckin right fool. well glory be. you FINALLY got something right. maybe there is a smidgen of hope for you after all
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Post by Deleted on Sept 3, 2008 13:27:19 GMT -6
Does the law of parties apply to deaths of criminals too? If two people commit a crime and one dies in the commission of the crime, does the other person get a more serious penalty because SOMEONE (even one of the criminals) died?
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mst3k4evur
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Post by mst3k4evur on Sept 3, 2008 13:30:42 GMT -6
Does the law of parties apply to deaths of criminals too? If two people commit a crime and one dies in the commission of the crime, does the other person get a more serious penalty because SOMEONE (even one of the criminals) died? Nope, I don't think you can punish someone, even their fellow criminal, for something that is quite legal.
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Post by Californian on Sept 3, 2008 13:56:44 GMT -6
Does the law of parties apply to deaths of criminals too? If two people commit a crime and one dies in the commission of the crime, does the other person get a more serious penalty because SOMEONE (even one of the criminals) died? Nope, I don't think you can punish someone, even their fellow criminal, for something that is quite legal. That's incorrect. Ohio executed one of a pair of criminal partners in just such a case. Two guys stuck up a liquor store. The store owner was armed, and killed one robber. The other robber was tried, convicted and executed for the death of his partner under the felony murder doctrine.
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Post by ichy on Sept 3, 2008 19:34:35 GMT -6
Nope, I don't think you can punish someone, even their fellow criminal, for something that is quite legal. That's incorrect. Ohio executed one of a pair of criminal partners in just such a case. Two guys stuck up a liquor store. The store owner was armed, and killed one robber. The other robber was tried, convicted and executed for the death of his partner under the felony murder doctrine. Awesome. I'd heard of a criminal in CA being charged for murder that way, but I never heard of an execution for that.
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mst3k4evur
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Ameeerrrrrricaaa, F**k Yah!
Posts: 3,701
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Post by mst3k4evur on Sept 3, 2008 19:58:00 GMT -6
Nope, I don't think you can punish someone, even their fellow criminal, for something that is quite legal. That's incorrect. Ohio executed one of a pair of criminal partners in just such a case. Two guys stuck up a liquor store. The store owner was armed, and killed one robber. The other robber was tried, convicted and executed for the death of his partner under the felony murder doctrine. Who and when?
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Sept 3, 2008 20:01:52 GMT -6
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Post by Shaka on Sept 3, 2008 20:28:58 GMT -6
Nope, I don't think you can punish someone, even their fellow criminal, for something that is quite legal. That's incorrect. Ohio executed one of a pair of criminal partners in just such a case. Two guys stuck up a liquor store. The store owner was armed, and killed one robber. The other robber was tried, convicted and executed for the death of his partner under the felony murder doctrine. Excellent!
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Rand
Banned
PRO-DP
Posts: 1,839
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Post by Rand on Sept 3, 2008 23:32:44 GMT -6
That's incorrect. Ohio executed one of a pair of criminal partners in just such a case. Two guys stuck up a liquor store. The store owner was armed, and killed one robber. The other robber was tried, convicted and executed for the death of his partner under the felony murder doctrine. Excellent! Pretty stupid in fact.
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Post by Shaka on Sept 3, 2008 23:38:17 GMT -6
Erm.... how so? If two people go out armed and ready to hold up a bank. One of them is trigger happy and kills someone. You saying the other guy shouldn't be held accountable. Sorry dude they both responsible they knowingly put people in danger, someone being killed was always a possibility hence they both should be executed. The fact his mate ( the shooter) bought it during the crime doesn't change that. Question: You say you are prodeathpenalty... for what crime? Being Jewish only?
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Rand
Banned
PRO-DP
Posts: 1,839
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Post by Rand on Sept 4, 2008 1:51:41 GMT -6
Erm.... how so? If two people go out armed and ready to hold up a bank. One of them is trigger happy and kills someone. You saying the other guy shouldn't be held accountable. Sorry dude they both responsible they knowingly put people in danger, someone being killed was always a possibility hence they both should be executed. The fact his mate ( the shooter) bought it during the crime doesn't change that. In fact the one charged with the killing is not even the one who shot. It is the clerk who shot the criminal. So it was self-defense here, not a murder. No murder, then you can't charge someone with murder. This is the danger of applying the law blindly like a robot. Oh no, being jewish is not a capital crime in my book. On the other hand, being gay is a capital crime for you. I'm pro-DP for murderers. But I believe it should not be mandatory, although the majority of them should get it.
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Post by Californian on Sept 4, 2008 8:46:44 GMT -6
You should cure your anti-communist obsession Cali. I'd invite you to pucker up and kiss my pasty white Irish ass, Froggy, but you might mistake that invitation for something other than rhetorical. Which is why we have juries.
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Rand
Banned
PRO-DP
Posts: 1,839
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Post by Rand on Sept 4, 2008 9:46:53 GMT -6
I'd invite you to pucker up and kiss my pasty white Irish ass, Froggy, but you might mistake that invitation for something other than rhetorical. Oh no don't worry, or I'd prefer to die otherwise.
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Post by Californian on Sept 4, 2008 11:49:52 GMT -6
I'd invite you to pucker up and kiss my pasty white Irish ass, Froggy, but you might mistake that invitation for something other than rhetorical. Oh no don't worry, or I'd prefer to die otherwise. In that case, pucker up! ;D
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Sept 4, 2008 16:08:50 GMT -6
Erm.... how so? If two people go out armed and ready to hold up a bank. One of them is trigger happy and kills someone. You saying the other guy shouldn't be held accountable. Sorry dude they both responsible they knowingly put people in danger, someone being killed was always a possibility hence they both should be executed. The fact his mate ( the shooter) bought it during the crime doesn't change that. Question: You say you are prodeathpenalty... for what crime? Being Jewish only? Been listening to a former member from this board, I see. She's slipping..still no knock on my door from DHS yet
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Post by Shaka on Sept 4, 2008 23:18:30 GMT -6
Erm.... how so? If two people go out armed and ready to hold up a bank. One of them is trigger happy and kills someone. You saying the other guy shouldn't be held accountable. Sorry dude they both responsible they knowingly put people in danger, someone being killed was always a possibility hence they both should be executed. The fact his mate ( the shooter) bought it during the crime doesn't change that. Question: You say you are prodeathpenalty... for what crime? Being Jewish only? Been listening to a former member from this board, I see. She's slipping..still no knock on my door from DHS yet I have no idea of what or who you referring to.
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Post by Shaka on Sept 4, 2008 23:35:58 GMT -6
Erm.... how so? If two people go out armed and ready to hold up a bank. One of them is trigger happy and kills someone. You saying the other guy shouldn't be held accountable. Sorry dude they both responsible they knowingly put people in danger, someone being killed was always a possibility hence they both should be executed. The fact his mate ( the shooter) bought it during the crime doesn't change that. In fact the one charged with the killing is not even the one who shot. It is the clerk who shot the criminal. So it was self-defense here, not a murder. No murder, then you can't charge someone with murder. This is the danger of applying the law blindly like a robot. Oh no, being jewish is not a capital crime in my book. On the other hand, being gay is a capital crime for you. I'm pro-DP for murderers. But I believe it should not be mandatory, although the majority of them should get it. You right I misread, I have rather a long workday. I took it that the partner died after murdering the shopkeeper, in which case the surviving partner should be eligible for DP. However as I recall you against the law of parties or anything remotely similar. Hopefully you'll see the light someday If you saying that their should be distinction between differing types of murder then I agree with you. Therefore DP should be a mandatory sentence for all 1st degree murderers, else you end up with the arbitary situation that exists the States. As for not want DP for Jews I some how doubt it from your comments about Jews and Israel. I think they have fat chance in a world ruled by Rand. Come on be man for once and admit what you really think.
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Post by Californian on Sept 4, 2008 23:49:47 GMT -6
You right I misread, I have rather a long workday. I took it that the partner died after murdering the shopkeeper, in which case the surviving partner should be eligible for DP. In the case I cited, the robber's partner was tried and executed for his fellow robber's death at the hands of the shopkeeper.
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Post by Shaka on Sept 5, 2008 0:06:57 GMT -6
You right I misread, I have rather a long workday. I took it that the partner died after murdering the shopkeeper, in which case the surviving partner should be eligible for DP. In the case I cited, the robber's partner was tried and executed for his fellow robber's death at the hands of the shopkeeper. Yes I went back and re-read, I misread big time. Unfortunately I have to eat humble pie Rand is right it's a case of self defence on the part of the shopkeeper. No way didn't consitute murder on anyones part. The partner should never have been convicted let alone executed for murder. Thank you for the update though.
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Post by Matt on Sept 5, 2008 0:21:16 GMT -6
It's a good law.
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